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Summary 
Payments for environmental services (PES) are payments 
to land owners whose land management practices help to 
provide environmental services (ES). In the context of 
watershed environmental services, the most important 
services are the supply, purification and regulation of 
water. 
PES was conceived as an instrument for facilitating the 
transition to a green economy. From this perspective, PES 
is a win-win solution to environmental degradation and 
poverty. 
Today, PES is a widely used policy tool for conservation. 
Having begun life as scattered, privately funded projects, 
PES has made its way into many national and internation-
al conservation policies around the world. The value of 
PES watershed transactions in 2011 was USD 8-10 billion; 
and the figure is still growing fast.  
This briefing paper challenges the notion of PES as a 
panacea for environmental degradation and poverty. 
While PES is a rapidly proliferating mechanism for natural 
resource management and conservation, its use is 
sometimes coupled with a lack of understanding of its 
social and economic impacts. To this end, we identify a 
number of critical issues that have received marginal 
policy attention in the context of the developing world, 
but which have a great deal of social relevance and 
impact.  
Understanding the critical issues surrounding PES can 
help to overcome and reduce the following drawbacks:  
 Power asymmetries in PES negotiations. PES often 
involves governments and private enterprises 
negotiating with marginalised communities. These 
actors’ differing resources and capabilities are likely to 
influence both the outcomes of negotiations and the 
operation of PES. Ensuring that the interests of 
marginalised communities are protected in PES 
negotiations is not just a social imperative, but also 
contributes to sustainability. 
 PES participation is not always voluntary. Environ-
mental laws, strict contract clauses, unclear partici-
pation mechanisms and intermediary agency pressure 
tend to force PES on service-providers. Voluntary 
participation should be guaranteed by implementing 
organisations. In addition, PES policies should inte-
grate peasants’ perspectives (i. e. what do providers 
think they need?), so that PES is a tool for rather than 
a hurdle to rural development.
 PES schemes are introduced in contexts where natural 
resource distribution is skewed. PES could exacerbate 
this skewed distribution or even reduce the degree of
control that the less powerful have over natural 
resources. In many situations, PES may result in 
service-providers not actually having access to the 
services they are helping to conserve, or losing control 
over their resources. PES should be tied to the fair 
redistribution of natural resource rights. 
 PES may compete with communal organisations, and 
erode cultural and conservation practices that are not 
based on monetary payments.
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Background 
Payments for environmental services (PES) are voluntary 
transactions in which users or beneficiaries pay service-
providers for conservation practices that are conducive to a 
continued or improved environmental service (ES) pro-
vision (see Box 1). 
Box 1: PES transactions 
PES schemes are financed by private environmental service 
users (e. g. hydro-electric power suppliers, agri-businesses 
and water companies), public agencies acting on behalf of 
citizens (e. g. national governments and local authorities) 
or from public-private partnerships.  
PES is based on the notion that natural resource 
degradation is the result of market failure and that the 
economic valuation of nature and the operation of 
conservation markets can halt environmental degradation. 
PES may therefore be seen as linked to the Green Economy 
Initiative, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation) and TEEB (The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity). As part of these worldwide 
initiatives and programmes, PES has received strong 
political support and has developed rapidly. 
However, the strong support for PES and its rapid develop-
ment are counterbalanced by a modest understanding of 
its socio-economic and cultural impacts (Bennett / Carroll / 
Hamilton, 2012). The implication is that we can solve 
environmental problems simply by throwing money at 
them. 
Critique of PES 
In this light, this paper critically analyses the impact of PES 
by not presupposing that ecosystems and their custodians 
are necessarily better off if they receive payments for 
conservation. To this end, we performed qualitative research 
between 2009 and 2013, in order to identify the significance 
of PES for the poorest families involved in the schemes 
under review (see Table 1 for a list of schemes studied). 
Table 1: PES schemes studied 
Country 
PES 
scheme 
ES 
Type of 
PES 
Service 
users 
Ecuador 
Nueva 
America  
Fresh water, 
water 
regulation 
and  
purification 
Private 
funding 
Urban 
water utility 
users 
Ecuador Chamachán 
Fresh water  
and  
water 
regulation 
Inter-
national 
and 
national 
public 
funding 
Irrigation 
users 
Colombia 
Cauca 
Valley 
Sugarcane 
Growers 
Nima 
Fresh water,  
water 
regulation 
and 
purification 
Private and 
public 
funding 
Irrigation 
users / 
Urban 
water utility 
users / 
Hydro-
electric 
company 
Colombia Chaina 
Fresh water, 
water 
regulation 
and  
purification 
Private 
funding 
Rural water 
utility users 
We go on to describe some of the problems surrounding 
PES, before concluding with some possible solutions. 
Power asymmetries between buyers and sellers need to 
be acknowledged. The PES narrative presents buyers and 
providers as equal players. At a field level, marginalised 
peasant and indigenous communities have to bargain not 
only with large hydroelectric and water companies and 
agri-businesses, but also with representatives of national, 
regional and municipal governments. In short, economic 
and political power asymmetries create an uneven playing 
field. The PES bargaining arena requires Western 
knowledge of technical, economic and legislative matters. 
Those who have this knowledge have an advantage in that 
they can secure a better deal for themselves than those 
who rely on traditional or local perspectives.  
The economic power of beneficiaries (i. e. buyers) means 
they are better placed to define what type of nature they 
want to see conserved (or bought). This is problematic 
for providers (i. e. sellers), as buyers tend to define nature, 
i.e. the type of nature they want to buy, as something 
separate from agriculture. For this reason, conservation 
Environmental service-providers
Intermediary
Environmental service-buyers (users)
Payment (in
cashor kind)
Environmental
services
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can become exclusionary and problematic for rural 
communities. 
In a similar vein, service-sellers are sometimes unable to 
voice their concerns about PES (Rodríguez de Francisco / 
Budds, forthcoming). For instance, many PES scheme 
boards consist exclusively of buyers, with no seats allotted 
to sellers. 
PES participation is not always voluntary. PES operates 
on top of environmental laws, which impose fines and 
other penalties on non-compliers. PES tends to reinforce 
environmental laws, in some cases due to the more fre-
quent presence of environmental authorities or the hiring 
of local forest rangers to monitor PES compliance. As a 
result, communities have to choose between joining a PES 
scheme and facing environmental penalties. Under a well-
known PES scheme in Ecuador, service-sellers wishing to 
leave the scheme are required to reimburse all previous 
payments. 
PES could reinforce a skewed distribution of rights to 
nature. Inequalities in access to natural resources follow 
mainly from power inequalities. In developing countries, PES 
schemes are often introduced in the context of rights of 
access to natural resources that are skewed in favour of the 
powerful (i. e. buyers). Service-sellers may therefore be 
unable to access the very services they are helping  
to conserve and consequently end up with limited land use 
possibilities due to conservation. Rather than redressing 
inequalities in the distribution of natural resources, PES may 
actually make it harder for sellers to use natural resources, 
while reproducing and sometimes even protecting skewed 
rights to natural resources in favour of service-buyers 
(Rodríguez de Francisco / Boelens, forthcoming). 
Some communities in the Colombian and Ecuadorian 
Andes have therefore argued that, instead of paying for 
conservation efforts, PES projects should give water rights 
to service-sellers. Granting water rights for irrigation would 
allow communities providing environmental services to 
have two harvests per year, thereby reducing pressure on 
key environmental areas. 
PES can harm service-sellers’ organisations, institutions 
and practices. PES schemes often make use of existing 
communal organisations in order to reduce transaction 
costs and because PES is expected to have a positive effect 
on collective action and the institutional capacities of 
communities. Given that certain members of a community 
might be more interested in PES than others, this is not 
always the case. For example, most indigenous and 
peasant organisations in Ecuador have a community as-
sembly. When PES was introduced into the community, 
peasants who were not interested in PES stopped attend-
ing the assemblies and the communal institutional capacity 
was reduced (Rodríguez de Francisco / Budds / Boelens, 
2013). 
PES is also problematic when it replaces existing non-
commodity relationships and collective action between 
families or communities. In many local societies, traditional 
reciprocal exchange relationships (based on labour, 
resources and services rather than money) form the back-
bone of culture and sustainable natural resource manage-
ment, and often provide livelihood security for the 
poorest families (Boelens / Hoogesteger-van-Dijk / 
Rodríguez de Francisco, 2014). Exchanging these 
relationships for a payment culture in which relationships 
are based exclusively on money can have pernicious social 
and environmental drawbacks. 
Agricultural and cultural practices include leaving land 
fallow in order to restore its productivity while providing 
environmental services. PES schemes that do not 
recognise this practice could end up by categorising 
fallow land use as deforestation and hence blocking any 
further   use   (Rodríguez   de  Francisco  /  Budds  /  Boelens, 
2013). 
Policy recommendations 
The framing of PES provides a simplified logic for action 
against environmental degradation. It is very appealing to 
policy-makers because it reduces complexity and 
simplifies decision-making. Nevertheless, we need to 
think outside the PES box. Its logic should not become a 
blinder to complexities such as power asymmetries, local 
struggles for natural resource control and green-grabbing 
practices. Before PES policies and programmes are 
introduced, policy planners need to address and 
investigate potential adverse impacts and the context-
specific question of external agents’ legitimacy to change 
property regimes, social relationships and natural resource 
values in the targeted watersheds. We need to take 
account of existing historical contexts, local institutions, 
the distribution of rights to natural resources, and internal 
and external pressures on sustainable practices of rural 
communities, i.e. pressures emanating from the political 
economy imposed on developing countries, agricultural 
prices, land pressures, development practices, etc. 
A debate is currently going on between PES advocates 
and opponents. Conservation policy-makers can draw 
valuable lessons from this debate, in order not to turn PES 
into an instrument that reinforces the status quo in terms 
of unequal natural resource access and burdens of 
conservation. In this sense, PES should be a tool for 
improving the position of marginalised communities and 
fostering peasant-based environmental conservation and 
environmental justice. 
The remaining question is how to move towards a more just 
form of environmental conservation. This is of paramount 
importance in the light of the current boom in market-based 
conservation policies such as PES and REDD+. 
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There is no straightforward way of addressing the power 
asymmetries in PES. However, there are certain conditions 
that need to be met in order to reduce the unequal degree 
of influence some actors may have over others.  
First, the negotiating process must be transparent, and 
service-sellers must have a say in setting the agenda. 
Community members of service-sellers should be given 
clear information on the pros and cons of PES, as well as 
impartial legal advice, so that they can understand and 
assess contractual provisions. 
Second, developmental and environmental organisations 
funding PES schemes should insist that their counterparts 
take account of the context-specific perspectives of natural 
resource managers living in poverty. How do PES schemes 
interact with struggles for natural resource control and 
who is likely to benefit most from such interventions?  
How do poor resource managers interact and shape 
conservation collaboration? This is crucial not just for 
understanding the viability of PES, but also for shaping
 conservation strategies that support the poor as well as 
rural development. What are their positions and power 
differentials? The voluntary participation of service-sellers 
cannot be taken for granted. 
Third, acknowledging that the skewed distribution of 
natural resources is one reason for environmental de-
gradation, policy-makers, development banks and en-
vironmental NGOs need to consider how PES can work as a 
tool for the redistribution of natural resources. They must 
analyse how the redistribution of resources can be a 
potential means of combating the current expansion of 
agricultural frontiers. 
Finally, researchers need to work together with commun-
ities in exploring whether PES schemes that redistribute 
natural resource rights can overcome the shortcomings 
generated by a culture of monetary payments. Research 
should focus on understanding and protecting the position 
of the least powerful in power plays and identifying how 
local institutions may be affected by this redistribution 
among environmental service-providers and users. 
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